The paper proposes a two-step approach to assessing the extent to which the fall in credit in crisis-stricken East Asian countries was a supply-or demand-induced phenomenon. The …rst step is based on the estimation of a demand function for excess liquid assets by commercial banks. Such a function is derived analytically in the …rst part of the paper. The second step consists in establishing dynamic projections for the periods following the crisis and assessing whether or not residuals are large enough to be viewed as indicators of "involuntary" accumulation of excess reserves. Results for Thailand indicate that the contraction in bank lending that accompanied the crisis was the result of supply factors.
Introduction
The causes of the sharp decline in credit to the private sector in the crisisstricken countries of East Asia (as discussed, for instance, by Alba et al. (1999) and Mishkin (1999) ) continue to generate much controversy among economists. Some observers have argued that the fall in bank credit resulted from a credit crunch, that is, increased incidence of credit rationing. Others have suggested that the decline in bank loans may have resulted instead from the reduction in the demand for credit, itself a consequence of the contraction in aggregate demand and the fall in output that accompanied the crisis.
Whether a contraction in domestic credit is due to supply or demand factors has, of course, important implications for monetary and …scal policies.
If banks are unwilling to lend because, for instance, of a perceived increase in the risk of default that cannot be internalized by raising the cost of borrowing, attempts to increase liquidity and force interest rates down to stimulate aggregate demand and the demand for loans will prove largely ine¤ective. By contrast, if banks are unable to lend (because …rms are curtailing their demand for credit as a result, for instance, of a perceived weakening in future demand and thus lower pro…ts), easing the …scal stance may help expand aggregate demand and generate an expansion in credit.
Recent attempts at determining whether the fall in bank credit in Asia's crisis-stricken countries resulted from supply or demand factors have provided mixed results. Several papers have used survey evidence on changes in bank lending and …rm borrowing during the crisis to assess the incidence of a credit crunch. Some of the better-known studies include those of Domaç and Ferri (1999a, 1999b ) , Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier (2000) , Dwor-Frecaut, Hallward-Driemeier, and Colaco (1999) , and Ito and Pereira da Silva (1999) .
The latter study, in particular, used survey data for commercial banks to argue in favor of a credit crunch in Thailand during the period extending from mid-1997 (immediately after the inception of the crisis) to early 1998. 1 By contrast, Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier (1998) found little evidence of a credit crunch in Thailand-in the sense of …rms with orders but unable to get credit to …nance working capital needs. The evidence that they gathered suggests, on the contrary, that constraining factors on output expansion appeared to have been weak perceived demand and the sharp increase in the price of imported inputs resulting from the large nominal exchange rate depreciation that occurred in the months following the crisis. 2 Along the same lines, Dwor-Frecaut, Hallward-Driemeier, and Colaco (1999) analyzed the results of a survey conducted between November 1998 and February 1999 in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand of 3,700 …rms, covering major manufacturing and export sectors. They found that at prevailing interest rates, credit availability in the aggregate was not seen by the surveyed …rms as a major constraint on production plans. They concluded therefore that the fall in credit was demand-driven.
Because survey evidence can be seriously biased-for instance, tight credit can reduce demand, and lack of demand may be perceived as the main problem by respondents-several other studies have relied on other methodologies. Domaç and Ferri (1999b) , for instance, used a conceptual framework based on the "credit view" of monetary policy to analyze the existence of a credit crunch in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Ito and Pereira da Silva (1999) , if the nominal credit stock is de ‡ated by a composite index consisting of consumer prices and the nominal exchange rate (in order to account for the fact that a signi…cant share of the loans provided by Thai commercial banks and …nance companies just before the crisis were denominated in foreign currency and the book value of these loans was recorded at the current exchange rate), the deceleration in the rate of growth of real credit to the private sector was quite dramatic in that country: a year-on-year contraction of -2.4 percent in August 1997, -5.3 percent in October, -12.2 percent in November and -18 percent in December (Ito and Pereira da Silva (1999, p. 14) ).
2 It should also be noted that in Thailand, …rms had contracted large amounts of unhedged short-term debt on world capital markets and were thus highly vulnerable to currency depreciation; see Alba et al. (1999) .
3 See Walsh (1998, Chapter 7) for a detailed discussion of the credit channel of monetary policy, particularly the role of informational asymmetries. Speci…cally, they argued that a widening of the spread between the lending rate and a representative rate on risk-free assets while at the same time real bank credit is falling represents prima facie evidence that the demand for loans could not have declined by more than the supply of credit. They found evidence (based on the spread between bank lending rates and corporate bonds) consistent with this view and thus concluded that the credit crunch was widespread, a¤ecting particularly small-sized …rms, for whom close substitutes for bank credit are unavailable. 4 By contrast, Ghosh and Ghosh (2000) used a switching regression framework for analyzing the behavior of real private credit in Korea and Indonesia.
They estimated both supply and demand functions for credit and determined, for each period, whether supply or demand was the constraining factor. They found that, in Indonesia (where the crisis started in September 1997), there was evidence of a credit crunch in the third and fourth quarters of 1997. By the end of the …rst of 1998, however, the decline in actual credit re ‡ected mostly the fall in the demand for loans induced by the deepening recession.
Similarly, in Korea (where the crisis started a month later) they found evidence of a credit crunch in the last quarter of 1997, but from the …rst quarter of 1998 onward, the constraining factor appears to have been the demand for credit. Thus, and in contrast to the survey-based evidence, the study by Ghosh and Ghosh provides evidence of both demand and supply factors at play: the fall in private sector lending in East Asia (at least in Korean and Indonesia) may have been the result of bank tightening of credit supply in the …rst stage, and a drop in borrower demand in the second stage. This paper attempts to shed additional light on the current controversy by proposing a two-step econometric approach. The …rst step is based on 4 It should be noted, however, that spreads can increase for a variety of reasons. For instance, in the model of Agénor and Aizenman (1998) , an increase in spreads may result from an expected rise in monitoring costs associated with lending operations. An expected tightening in prudential regulations requiring banks to hold more liquid assets may also lead to higher spreads, to the extent that these assets yield lower returns (and thus lower income) than other assets that the banks would have chosen otherwise. the estimation of a demand function for excess reserves (or liquid assets) by commercial banks that captures, in particular, the precautionary motive for holding nonremunerated assets. The second step consists in establishing dynamic projections for the periods following the crisis and assessing whether actual values of excess reserves are "close enough" (in a statistical sense that is made more precise below) to those predicted by a stable regression model. If that is the case, the increase in actual holdings of excess reserves can be construed as consistent with a supply-induced reduction in credit; if that is not the case, the accumulation of excess liquid assets can be seen as "involuntary"-in which case the slowdown in credit is more likely to re ‡ect a reduction in demand. Underlying our approach is the view that increased incidence of rationing-particularly of the more risky categories of borrowers-may take the form of increases in excess reserve holdings motivated, in the context of a crisis, by higher perceived uncertainty or risk of default. Greater volatility of deposits (relative to currency holdings) and increased riskiness of lending, in particular, may also prompt banks to hold higher levels of precautionary excess reserves.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II presents a theoretical model of the demand for excess liquid reserves by commercial banks in the presence of both liquidity risk and real sector volatility. The impact of various variables (including required reserves and funding costs) on the demand for excess reserves is also analyzed. Section III presents estimates of the resulting demand equation for Thailand; it also discusses the in-sample properties of the model. Section IV examines the performance of the dynamic forecasts generated by the model and analyzes whether the regression forecasts are consistent with the hypothesis of a credit crunch.
The last section summarizes the results and o¤ers some concluding remarks.
A Model of Excess Liquid Assets
At the heart of our analysis of the factors underlying the fall in credit in East Asia is a model of excess liquid reserves. As is well known from the early literature surveyed by Baltensperger (1980) , Santomero (1984) and Swank (1996) , reserve management models deal with a bank's funding or liquidity risk. To manage this type of risk, and in deciding how much cash and other liquid assets they should hold, banks internalize the fact that they can draw funds from either the interbank market or the central bank in case of unexpected contingencies. 5 To begin with, consider the following simple model of reserve management (Baltensperger (1980) ). Assume that there is only one representative bank whose deposits D are given exogenously. The bank must decide upon the level of liquid, non-interest bearing reserve assets, R, and non-reserve assets, which take the form of illiquid loans, L. Its balance sheet is given by
Reserves are necessary because the bank is exposed to liquidity risk. Deposit ‡ows u 2 (u L ; u H ) occur randomly according to a density function Á = © 0 . When the net out ‡ow of cash exceeds the reserves, u¸R, the bank must face illiquidity costs that are taken to be proportional to the reserve de…ciency max(0; u ¡ R). Put di¤erently, in case of illiquidity the bank must borrow the missing reserves at a penalty rate q, with q > r L , where r L is the interest rate on loans. Let r D denote the deposit rate; the bank's pro…t is
which implies that the bank's expected pro…t is
that is, using (1):
Assuming risk neutrality, the optimal level of reserves is determined so as to maximize expected pro…ts. The necessary condition is thus: 6
that is
Equation (4) 
Similarly, the supply of deposits by the public, D, is taken to be positively related to the deposit rate and proportional to expected output:
Suppose that agents determine L and D at the beginning of each period, before the realization of shocks to output. In addition, there is a demand for cash determined at the end of the period, following the realization of output and liquidity shocks. The bank is required to maintain liquid reserves in proportion to its deposit base, at the interest rate r. Let µ denote the reserve requirement rate and R total reserves; excess reserves, Z, are thus given by
that is, using (1) to eliminate R,
With C denoting currency holdings, the equilibrium condition of the money market is given by
where k is the reciprocal of velocity (assumed constant in what follows) and Y realized output. Suppose that the demand for cash is also proportional to realized output; speci…cally, let us assume that
where c = C=D. We will assume in what follows that both output and ck=(1 + c) are random and given by
where " and » are random shocks. Using (9) and (10), the demand for cash can be rewritten as
For simplicity of exposition, suppose that the composite term (1 + ")(1 + »), denoted x, is normally distributed with constant mean ¹ and constant variance ¾ 2 :
To meet unexpected withdrawals (unanticipated demand for cash), the bank now can not only borrow at a penalty rate of q, as in the simple model presented above, but it may also use its excess reserves, Z. Using (7), the expected reserve de…ciency is thus now given by
Using this result, together with (5), (6), (8), and (11), the bank's expected pro…ts can be written as
Assuming that the functions f(¢) and g(¢) are quasi-concave functions, the following propositions can be established:
Proposition 1 An increase in the penalty rate increases deposits and lending rates, as well as excess reserves held by commercial banks.
Proposition 2 An increase in the volatility of output and liquidity shocks has ambiguous e¤ects on the deposit rate, the lending rate, and excess reserves. If the initial level of the penalty rate is su¢ciently high, an increase in volatility has a positive e¤ect on all three variables.
Proposition 3 An increase in the reserve requirement rate unambiguously raises the lending rate and lowers excess reserves. If the degree of volatility is not too high, it also raises the deposit rate.
Proof of the results summarized in these propositions are provided in Appendix A. Proposition I implies that, for a high enough level of the penalty rate, excess reserves will exceed expected withdrawals, that is, Z ¡ ¹ > 0. Under such conditions, Propositions 1, 2 and 3 can be combined to lead to the following demand function for excess reserves:
Equation (14) forms the basis of our empirical investigation.
Application to Thailand
As noted in the introduction, the …rst step of our approach to assessing the extent to which the credit crunch that East Asian countries experienced in the immediate aftermath of their …nancial crisis was a supply or demandinduced phenomenon consists in estimating a demand function for excess liquid reserves by commercial banks. We apply our procedure to Thailand, a country where the contraction in credit was particularly severe and the increase in excess liquid assets held by the banking system very large (see below).
Equation (14) can be viewed as providing a static benchmark speci…cation for desired, as opposed to actual, excess reserves. This benchmark speci…-cation is estimated in a fairly general dynamic setting to allow the model to capture the dynamics present in the data.
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Speci…cally, the estimated demand equation for excess reserves by banks is expressed by the following autoregression, which accounts for contemporaneous as well as lagged e¤ects:
where À t is a well-behaved error term and a j (L) are lag polynomials, de…ned as
where L is the lag operator. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of excess liquid assets held by commercial banks, EL, over total bank deposits, D. The regressors are lagged values of (the log of) the ratio of excess reserves to deposits; current and lagged values of (the log of) the ratio of required liquid assets, RR, to total bank deposits, D; current and lagged values of the coe¢cient of variation of the cash-to-deposit ratio, C=D, and the deviation of output from trend, Y =Y T ; and current and lagged values of the discount rate, r, which corresponds to the penalty rate identi…ed in (14).
As noted by Van't Dack (1999) , the discount window has been the last resort facility for banks and …nance companies in Thailand. 9 EXP O is a measure of foreign exchange exposure, discussed below.
The above speci…cation captures the main features of the model derived earlier.
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In particular, ln RR=D captures the impact of reserve requirements as derived in equation (14); CV C=D and V Y=Y T account for the impact of volatility and liquidity risk, and thus the precautionary e¤ect on the demand for reserves, as emphasized in (14). The penalty rate, r, is proxied by two interest rates. The …rst is the discount rate; as noted by Van't Dack (1999) , the discount window has been the last resort facility for banks and …nance companies in Thailand. The second is the money market rate which, to some extent, also re ‡ected the cost of liquidity in the market. Notice also that the dynamics of adjustment of the demand of EL=D is captured by the lagged values of ln(EL=D) in the regression. In addition, the regression includes ln(Y=Y T ) to proxy for changes in the demand for cash. A cyclical downturn, for instance, would lead banks to anticipate lower, transactionsrelated, demand for currency by the public and would therefore lead them to decrease their holdings of excess reserves. The lags account for the possibility of a gradual impact of funding costs and cyclical movements in output on the demand for excess reserves.
Finally, the last variable, EXP O, is an attempt to introduce explicitly a measure of exposure to exchange rate ‡uctuations. The idea is that banks that are exposed to currency depreciation (because their net foreign liabilities are positive and unhedged) may be tempted to hold more cash than needed to satisfy unanticipated withdrawals, because of the possibility of an increase in the domestic-currency value of debt service payments. To capture this e¤ect, we de…ne EXP O as the di¤erence between foreign-currency liabilities and assets divided by total bank deposits times the rate of nominal depreciation. The …gure shows 1 1 We also experimented with an alternative de…nition, in which EXP O is calculated as the ratio of commercial banks's foreign-currency liabilities to foreign-currency assets, multiplied by the rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. The results were similar to those reported in Table 1. 1 2 As noted in Sirivedhin (1998) , prudential regulations in Thailand around the time of the crisis required commercial banks to hold liquid assets (averaged over a fortnight) of not less than seven percent of their deposit base; eligible assests included at least two percent non-interest-bearing deposits at the Bank of Thailand, a maximum of 2.5 percent cash in vault, and (making up the remainder) bonds issued by the government, approved state enterprises, specialized …nancial institutions or the Bank of Thailand.
that excess liquid assets started to increase signi…cantly well before the crisis (as early as late 1996), rising quite dramatically in the immediate aftermath of the currency and …nancial turmoil that began with the devaluation of the baht in July 1997. At the same time, the cyclical component of output turned sharply negative. The …gure also shows that the money market rate ‡uctuated considerably during the period 1992-98-exceeding at times the discount rate and falling well below it at other times. Finally, both the ratio of credit to the private sector to deposits, and the ratio of currency in circulation to deposits, increased at …rst and subsequently fell in the aftermath of the crisis. Table 1 presents the summary of the estimation results of the autoregression using ordinary least squares based on monthly data and using the entire sample ending in September 1998. Panel A shows the results obtained when using the discount rate as the penalty rate and Panel B those obtained when the money market rate is used. In both panels, we present three regressions, corresponding to three di¤erent methods for detrending output: the quadratic trend …lter (equation (1)), the standard Hodrick-Prescott …lter (equation (2)), and the Baxter-King band-pass …lter (equation (3)).
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The table reports the sum of the coe¢cients and their standard errors of the lags of the regressors included in the estimation because individual coe¢cients in the autoregression are di¢cult to interpret directly. Conceptually, the sum of the coe¢cients are obtained by estimating the dynamic model and then setting L = 1. Thus, the sum of the coe¢cients reported in the table correspond to the long-run e¤ects once they have been appropriately scaled by:
1 ¡ a 1 (1). In other words, Table 1 summarizes the long-run e¤ects on the demand for ln(EL=D) for p = 6. The more traditional method to examine 1 3 The band-pass …lter is essentially a moving average that …lters both high frequency "noise" and low frequency "trends", leaving behind ‡uctuations at the typical business cycle frequencies. The …lter is constructed by combining a low-pass …lter and a highpass …lter and imposing constraints that eliminate ‡uctuations at frequencies higher and lower than those corresponding to typical business cycle frequencies. See Baxter and King (1995). long-run e¤ects, cointegration analysis, is not carried out here because of the short time period spun by the data sample.
14 Moreover for the purpose at hand of providing a empirical framework to generate forecasts of ln(EL=D) within the framework provided by equation (14), a reduced from autoregression will contain all of the information in the data without taking a stand on critical issues such as the number of unit roots and cointegrating vectors in the empirical model based on a fairly short sample.
Consider the main empirical results when the penalty rate, r, is the discount rate (Panel A, Table 1 ). The estimation results are in general consistent with our priors although the precision (ratio of the coe¢cient to its standard error) with which these e¤ects are measured is a bit low.
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In particular, ln(RR=D) appears to have a negative impact on ln(EL=D) as expected in all three regressions, although this e¤ect is much smaller using the BaxterKing …lter (equation (3)). The volatility of ln(C=D), as proxied by CV C=D , tends to increase ln(EL=D) in all three regressions, particularly with the Baxter-King …lter. The volatility of Y =Y T , as proxied by C V Y=Y T , is incorrectly signed in the …rst two regressions but not in the third, although in that case it is measured imprecisely. The cyclical component of output, as measured by ln(Y =Y T ), has a positive e¤ect on the demand for excess liquid assets in all three regressions; this e¤ect, however, is precisely measured only when the quadratic trend …lter is used (regression (1)). The sum of the coe¢cients on the cyclical component of output on the demand of EL=D con…rms the role that cyclical conditions have on ln(EL=D), and these effects tend to be more precisely measured. The e¤ect of an increase in the penalty rate, r, is to increase ln(EL=D) in the …rst and third cases; when the Hodrick-Prescott …lter is used, the penalty rate has a perverse e¤ect. The foreign exposure variable has the expected sign in the …rst two regressions but is not measured with precision. Finally, the sum of the coe¢cients and the precision with which the e¤ect of lagged EL=D is measured is suggestive of signi…cant dynamic adjustment by commercial banks demand for excess liquidity.
The results obtained when the penalty rate, r, is proxied by the money market rate (Panel B, Table 1 ) are qualitatively similar to those discussed above. The main di¤erences are that a ) the volatility of the currency-todeposits ratio has a perverse (but not signi…cant) e¤ect on the demand for excess liquid assets when the quadratic trend is used; and b) the perverse e¤ect of the penalty rate obtained earlier when using the Hodrick-Prescott …lter now disappears. Panel C drops from the regression equation the penalty rate and our measure of foreign exchange exposure because their e¤ect on the demand for excess liquid assets is not estimated with precision and/or correctly signed in Panels A and B. These are the equations that we focus on in what follows.
We now examine the stability of the estimated coe¢cients in Panel C.
These stability tests are important because they allow us to determine the extent to which the di¤erence between the pre-and post-crisis behavior of excess liquid assets, as predicted by the model, re ‡ects changes in the behavior of the determinants of the demand for these assets (as captured in the regression model), as opposed to changes in the parameters characterizing the behavior of commercial banks. The tests proposed by Andrews (1993) were used to examine the stability of the estimates because the date of the potential change in the parameters is unknown. The test boils down to choosing the largest statistic from a series of standard Chow tests, and because the break point is unknown the distribution of the max-Chow test is non-standard. These Chow tests were performed from June 1994 to December 1997, variable by variable, and the results are shown in Table 2 . 16 Thus, 1 6 Ideally, we would have preferred to perform the stability test on the equation as these tests would capture any instability in the period associated with the initial increase in the ratio of excess liquid assets to deposits ratio, and the immediate aftermath of the Baht crisis in July 1997. Following the Andrews test procedure, June 1994 and December 1997 correspond respectively to the data between the 32.5 (¼ 1 ) and 80.5 (¼ 2 ) percentiles of the full sample period, so that the critical values correspond to a¸that is roughly equal to 9.0. At a 5 percent signi…cance level, these tests provides evidence of stability using the quadratic trend and Hodrick-Prescott …lters, but stability is rejected for the Baxter-King …lter for all the variables, except the cyclical component of output. At the one percent level, the e¤ects of two variables (the cyclical component of output and the required reserve ratio) are stable, the e¤ect of the output volatility measure is "borderline" stable, whereas the e¤ects of the last two variables continue to display some evidence of instability. On balance, our results indicate that, despite the turbulence associated with the Asian crisis in 1997-98, there is only mixed evidence that this translated into instability in the estimated parameters. 
where -t is a vector containing the information set used to make the forecasts h-periods ahead, that is, for the previous month and the actual values of the other regressors, so that previous forecasts of ln(EL=D) feed into its subsequent forecasts. The estimated standard errors of the forecasts ignore the sampling variance of the coe¢cients, as is standard practice (see Granger and Newbold (1986, p. 158) , and Doan (1996, pp. 14-76) ). Figure 3 shows the behavior of the observed value of ln(EL=D) and the dynamic forecasts of that variable for each of the three speci…cations in Panel C of Table 1 higher excess liquid assets consistent with the type of behavior that theory predicts would determine the demand for these assets.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to propose an alternative approach to examining the extent to which the fall in credit that characterized most crisisstricken countries in East Asia re ‡ected a credit crunch, that is, increased incidence of credit rationing by banks. We began by developing a demand function for excess reserves (or liquid assets) by commercial banks that captured, in particular, the impact of reserve requirements, funding costs, and precautionary motives related to liquidity risk and output volatility. We then estimated a dynamic version of the model and showed that the evidence against stability of the model is weak using standard tests. We then used the model to establish dynamic projections for the post-crisis period (July 1997 to October 1998). Our general assumption is that if actual values of excess reserves are within one-or two-standard error bands, the observed reduction in credit can be deemed to be consistent with a supply-side phenomenon.
On the contrary, if actual values are outside the errors bands, this can be construed as evidence of "involuntary" accumulation of excess reserves; the slowdown in credit may thus more likely re ‡ect a reduction in the demand for loans-possibly re ‡ecting …rms' perceived weaknesses in future demand for their products.
Our results suggest that the fall in bank lending in Thailand seems to have been a re ‡ection of a supply phenomenon, as argued by those who believe in the credit crunch hypothesis. Overall, therefore, our results are consistent with those obtained by Ito and Pereira da Silva (1999) and with those of Domaç and Ferri (1999a ) , whose study indicates that small and mediumsized …rms in Thailand faced binding constraints in accessing credit markets in the aftermath of the crisis. It would be useful to apply the methodology developed here to other crisis-stricken countries in East Asia; whether this would prove fruitful or not remains to be seen. As noted by various authors, in Indonesia the ratio of excess reserves to deposits did not display the same sharp increase observed in Thailand.
Appendix A Derivation of Propositions 1 to 3
Assuming that the functions f (¢) and g(¢) are quasi-concave, the results summarized in Propositions 1and 2 can be written as
To establish these results, we begin by rewriting (13), with Y e normalized to unity, and using (1) to eliminate R, as
Assuming, as indicated in the text, that x is normally distributed with constant mean ¹ and constant variance ¾ 2 , this expression can be rewritten as
where Á is the density function of x (assumed normal). Maximizing this expression with respect to the deposit and lending rates yields the …rst-order conditions
where © is the cumulative distribution function of x. Let " D = r D g 0 =g and " L = ¡r L f 0 =f denote, respectively, the elasticities of the supply of deposits by the public and the demand for loans. The above expressions can be rewritten as
which imply that
These expressions indicate, in particular, that an increase in the penalty rate q raises both the deposit and lending rates to an extent that is inversely related to the elasticity of supply of deposits and demand for loans.
Let us assume that the
Under these assumptions, it can indeed be established that both dr L =dq and dr D =dq are positive. To do so, note that
We have
so that h rLrL < 0 at h rL = 0. The latter condition, which is equivalent to f +(r L ¡r)f 0 = 0, implies that r L ¡ r = ¡f =f 0 . Substituting this result in the de…nition of h rLrL gives, at
or equivalently f f 00 ¡ 2(f 0 ) 2 < 0. Similar derivations yield the second result in (A1).
The e¤ect of q on r L can be assessed from
¢ is positive from the second-order conditions for pro…t maximization. We therefore have
where ¡ is de…ned as
The above expression can be rewritten as
To show that dr L =dq > 0 requires therefore showing that ¡ < 0. To do so, note …rst that quasi-concavity of g(¢) implies that g 00 < 2(g 0 ) 2 =g, so that
From the …rst-order conditions for pro…t maximization, the quantity (r ¡ r D )g 0 ¡ g is equal to ¡q(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ©)g 0 . Substituting this result on the right-hand side of the above expression implies that the term in brackets is zero and therefore that ¡ < 0. Thus, from (A4), dr L =dq > 0.
The e¤ect of q on r D can be assessed in a similar manner. Speci…cally, it can be established that
or equivalently
Given the above de…nitions,
From the …rst-order conditions for pro…t maximization, the term in brackets on the right-hand side of this expression is also equal to
which is equal to
Thus, from (A5), dr D =dq > 0:
The e¤ect of q on excess reserves is straightforward; it can be established that, given the above results,
Let us establish the e¤ects of a change in ¾. From a system similar to (A2), we can establish that
This result implies that, given the sign assumptions, and given that, as shown above,
It can also be established that
Finally, let us consider the e¤ect of a change in the reserve requirement rate, µ, on interest rates and excess reserves, as summarized in Proposition 3. It can be shown that, in a manner analogous to (A2),
This implies that, using the de…nition of ¡ given above in (A3):
from which it can be veri…ed that, given that ¡ < 0, dr L =dµ > 0.
We also have
It can be established that the term in parentheses on the right-hand side is equivalent to
Given the assumptions speci…ed given above, the …rst term is negative whereas the second is positive. If the degree of volatility is not too high (that is, if ¾ is small) the …rst term will dominate and, given that ¡ < 0, we will have dr D =dµ > 0.
Finally, to assess the impact of µ on Z, note that from the …rst-order conditions,
This expression implies that
The expression in brackets on the right-hand side can be rewritten as
As shown earlier, dr L =dµ > 0; thus, dZ=dµ < 0.
Appendix B Data Sources and De…nitions
The data used in this study are at a monthly frequency and cover the period January 1992 to October 1998. The variables are de…ned and measured as follows.
-Excess liquid assets, EL, are from Bank of Thailand.
-Required liquid assets, RR, are from Bank of Thailand.
-Total deposits, D, are the sum of demand, time, and savings deposits in deposit money banks. The data are from International Financial Statistics (IFS), sum of line 24 and 25.
-Currency, C , is de…ned as currency in circulation outside of deposit money banks. Data are from IFS (line 14a).
-Manufacturing output, Y , is a seasonally-adjusted index, with 1990 as a base period. The data are from the International Monetary Fund.
-The trend component of manufacturing output, Y T , is the quadratic trend which is equal to the …tted value obtained by regressing Y on constant term, time and time squared variables.
-The discount rate, r is from IFS (line 60).
-The coe¢cient of variation for the log of currency to deposit ratio, CV [ln(C=D)], and the log of manufacturing output to trend component ratio, CV [ln(Y =Y T )] are equal to the standard deviation of the speci…ed variable divided by the average of it for 3 leads and lags, centered on the current period. Ratio of excess liquid assets to deposits ratio Interest rates
Output
Credit to the private sector to deposit ratio (in percent) Currency to total bank deposits ratio 
